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# Heritage- and ideology-based national identities and their implications for immigrant citizen relations in the United States and in Germany

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## ABSTRACT

The present research examines the meaning of national identity in the United States and Germany and its implications for immigrant citizen relations. In Study 1, American and German participants responded to the question “What does it mean to be American [German]?” Results revealed that the American national identity is ideology-based as characterized by an endorsement of a core set of transcendent and abstract values. The German national identity is heritage-based as characterized by self-descriptive traits and cultural traditions. In Study 2, American participants were less likely than German participants to express exclusion from national identity in response to an immigrant who gave affective versus pragmatic reasons for becoming a citizen. The reverse was true for German participants. In sum, culture shapes national identity and responses to immigrants.

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## 1. Heritage- and ideology-based national identities and their implications for immigrant citizen relations in the United States and in Germany

How a citizen treats an immigrant in his or her society of settlement is more than a matter of personal preference. Reactions to immigrants often reflect assumptions about national identity—ideas about “us” as citizens and “them” as outsiders—that are collectively shared. Because these assumptions are a product of historical, legal, and cultural forces (Brubaker, 1992; Feldblum, 1997; Fetzer, 2000; Joppke, 1999; Kastoryano, 2002; Sassen, 1999; Soysal, 1994), the concept of national identity can have different meanings and evoke different responses towards immigrants in one national context compared to another. For example, citizens might have different conceptualizations of what their national identity means to them and thus how fully immigrants can and should claim that identity.

In particular, a citizen in one national context might have what we have termed an “ideology-based” national identity, an identity that is characterized by an *endorsement of a core set of transcendent and abstract national values* (e.g., freedom, democracy). By contrast, a citizen in another national context might have what we have termed a “heritage-based” national identity, an identity characterized by *expression of self-descriptive traits* (e.g., personality traits) and *cultural traditions*.

One implication of this divergence in national identity is that the conditions under which citizens have inclusive attitudes towards immigrants should systemically vary with the predominant national identity type. Citizens with an ideology-based national identity should be open if immigrants express emotional attachment towards their adopted country because that

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validates the abstract values that constitute their country's identity. By contrast, citizens with a heritage-based national identity should be closed if immigrants express emotional attachment to their adopted country because that threatens the distinctiveness of their country's identity that is defined by specific traits and traditions.

Our research strategy was to advance these basic ideas in two cross-cultural studies, comparing a country that we posit has a predominately ideology-based national identity, the United States, and one that we posit has a predominately heritage-based national identity, Germany. Both are large countries of immigration that differ in their policies for defining citizenship, with the United States representing *jus soli* (Latin: *right of soil*) and Germany representing *jus sanguinis* (Latin: *right of blood*; Joppke, 1999).

### 1.1. Models of citizenship and types of national identity

Drawing from cultural psychological approaches showing that historical conditions can shape present-day psychological experiences (Cohen, 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003), we suggest that ideology- and heritage-based national identities evolved from historical conditions related to how nation-states conceptualize citizenship.

Great Britain, the United States, and Canada, for instance, define citizenship according to *jus soli*, ascribing citizenship to all persons born within their territorial boundaries (Brubaker, 1992). Any individual, regardless of their parents' country of origin, is automatically granted citizenship if they are born within these territories, as citizenship runs "through the soil". *Jus soli* laws developed in historical contexts where the state was first an abstract political fact and national sentiments developed later (Brubaker, 1992). If the concept of the state pre-existed the people who were to become citizens, as in *jus soli* countries, then we propose that an ideology-based national identity evolved. An ideology-based identity is expressed when members *adhere to a core set of transcendent and abstract values*, such as peace, democracy, and freedom. Depending on a given nation's culture and history these values will vary. But because of citizens' diverse backgrounds and ancestry, endorsing broad transcendent values is the necessary adhesive that unites individuals into a single nation-state. As such, an ideology-based identity is an example of a "common identity group", where individuals define their membership based on direct attachment to the group identity rather than on a feeling of similarity to other group members (Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994).

In contrast, many European countries define citizenship according to *jus sanguinis*, ascribing citizenship to the descendants of citizens (Brubaker, 1992). At its core, descendants of citizens are ascribed citizenship regardless of where they reside, as citizenship runs "through the blood". *Jus sanguinis* laws developed in historical contexts where national feelings, cultures, and groups of individuals pre-existed the nation-state (Brubaker, 1992). Consequently, self-understanding in these countries does not expect immigrants with diverse cultural heritages to join the nation-state. If shared ancestry, customs, and daily practices preceded the nation-state, as in *jus sanguinis* countries, then we propose that a heritage-based national identity evolved.

A heritage-based identity is expressed when *members perceive that they share self-descriptive traits and cultural traditions*. These traits are dispositions that are associated with a social category and embraced as self-descriptive by members of that category (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004). A heritage-based identity is similar to an ethnic identity (Phinney, 2000) in that individuals define their membership based on shared ancestry and cultural elements.

We acknowledge that the association between citizenship laws and types of national identity is complex and the type of national identity a citizen expresses is determined by a multitude of factors (Salzar & Salzar, 1998). Nevertheless, our central argument is that citizenship laws, as elements of the cultural context in which citizens exist, may contribute to how citizens perceive and express their national identity (see also Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009). Accordingly, we hypothesize that citizens of countries with a *jus soli* tradition should be more likely than citizens of countries with a *jus sanguinis* tradition to define national identity in terms of a given core set of transcendent and abstract values. By contrast, citizens of countries with a *jus sanguinis* tradition should be more likely than citizens of countries with a *jus soli* tradition to define national identity in terms of a given set of shared self-descriptive traits and cultural traditions. As an initial investigation (Study 1), we focus on the United States, where we should find evidence of an ideology-based national identity, and Germany, where we should find evidence of a heritage-based national identity, and examine everyday lay definitions of national identity that American and German citizens report.

### 1.2. The United States and Germany as examples of ideology- and heritage-based national identities

#### 1.2.1. The United States as an example of an ideology-based national identity

The American national identity has always been political. An ethnically diverse group of pilgrims created the American state as a political construct; hence, the national identity formed around the ideology of the founding values. These values—equality, liberty, individualism, populism and laissez-faire economics<sup>3</sup> (Fukuyama, 2007; Lipset, 1996)—are values that citizens from diverse backgrounds can easily reconcile with their individual ethnic identities. Moreover, the history of the United States is a history of immigration (Handlin, 1951). Indeed, the American naturalization law is the epitome of the *jus soli* citizenship policy. Citizenship is granted based on whether one is born in the United States, and there are few

<sup>3</sup> The founding value of laissez-faire economics may have changed following the economic crisis in 2009.

barriers for immigrants who would like to attain it later in life (<http://uscis.gov>). According to Devos and Banaji (2005), this produces a more rapidly changing citizenry in national origin in comparison to other countries. We hypothesize that citizens from countries with *jus soli* citizenship policies—American citizens—conceptualize national identity in terms of a core set of transcendent and abstract values.

### 1.2.2. Germany as an example of a heritage-based national identity

Nationhood in Germany was mostly an ethno-cultural rather than a political fact, and national feelings developed long before the nation-state (Brubaker, 1992). Accordingly, there were—and still are—strong ties holding the German nation together that reach far beyond its political representation. Even though Germany's history of immigration dates back for more than a century, most Germans still do not perceive their country as a nation of immigrants (Wagner & Machleit, 1986). Consistent with its view that citizenship is cultural, Germany, until recently, awarded citizenship according to a *jus sanguinis* policy, ascribing citizenship to the descendents of citizens. We hypothesize that citizens from countries with a tradition of *jus sanguinis* citizenship policies—German citizens—conceptualize national identity in terms of self-descriptive traits and cultural traditions.

### 1.3. Present research

The first and main objective of the present research is to explore if and how ideology- and heritage-based models of citizenship penetrate into lay definitions of national identity. A second objective is to shed light on the implications of these national identity types for citizen-immigrant relations. Study 1 utilizes content analysis to examine lay definitions of national identity that American and German citizens report. We expect that citizens from countries with *jus soli* citizenship policies—American citizens—conceptualize national identity in terms of a core set of transcendent and abstract values. By contrast, we expect citizens from countries with *jus sanguinis* citizenship policies—German citizens—to conceptualize national identity in terms of self-descriptive traits and cultural traditions.

Different conceptualizations of national identity should have implications for how people relate to immigrants who express values that are consistent or inconsistent with the type of national identity at play in a given culture. Citizens may be more open towards immigrant who endorse values that are consistent with their national identity than towards immigrants who endorse values that are inconsistent with their national identity. Study 2 tests American and German citizens' exclusion of an immigrant who either fulfills or rejects the expectations associated with their national identity.

## 2. Study 1

Study 1 involved a content analysis of American and German participants' responses to the question "What does it mean to be American [German]?" Judges coded whether or not essays included either ideology-based (e.g., "national identity means freedom") or heritage-based (e.g., "national identity means being punctual") statements. We expected that American participants would be more likely to mention ideology-based concepts in their essays relative to German participants whereas German participants would be more likely to mention heritage-based concepts relative to American participants. These findings would provide initial evidence for the models of national identity.

### 2.1. Method

#### 2.1.1. Participants

Fourteen out of 62 American participants and three out of 69 Germans were excluded because they were not born in their country of residence, three Americans and four Germans because they did not comply with our instructions by writing unrelated or no essays leaving 45 (23 women, 19 men, and 3 no gender recorded) American citizens and 62 (27 women, 32 men, and 3 no gender recorded) German citizens in this sample. The mean age of American participants was 35.34 years ( $SD = 15.35$ , 4 no age recorded) and mean age of German participants was 35.72 years ( $SD = 16.55$ , 2 no age recorded),  $t(99) = -.12$ , *ns*. The majority of American participants identified as "middle-class" (36%) or "upper middle class" (33%) and had a secondary degree (Associate or Bachelor's degree: 33%; graduate school: 18%). The rest had a high school degree or GED as their highest level of education (44%) or less than that (5%). For political orientation, 31% consider themselves liberals and 27% conservatives, the rest had no political affiliation (24%; 18% no political orientation recorded).

The majority of German participants identified as "middle-class" (52%) or "upper middle class" (26%) and had a secondary degree (Fachhochschulabschluss: 26%; Universitaetsabschluss: 13%) or were working towards a secondary degree as their highest level of education (Abitur or Fachabitur: 24%). The rest were either less educated (Mittlere Reife and Berufsfachabschluss: 15%) or indicated "other" (18%; 1% no degree; 3% no education recorded). For political orientation, 63% considered themselves liberals and 13% conservatives, the rest had no political affiliation (5%; 19% no political orientation recorded).

#### 2.1.2. Stimulus materials

For all stimulus materials and measures, back translation methodologies were used (Brislin, 1970). One American research assistant fluent in German translated the original materials from English to German. A German assistant fluent in English

then translated the German version back to English and both versions were compared. Inconsistencies were resolved by discussion between the two translators and the investigators.

All participants were unaware that the study was conducted in different countries. They were provided with the following instructions:

Please think about what it means to be an American [German]. On the following lines below please list what being American [German] means to you. Write as much or as little as you wish, and don't worry about how well it's written. Just focus on expressing your thoughts and feelings.

### 2.1.3. Procedure

Participants were recruited in public locations in Connecticut, United States and Baden-Württemberg, Germany as part of a larger study on national identity. In both places, research assistants went to outdoor fairs and parks on sunny days, set up recruiting tables and invited people who passed the table to participate in a research study on "impression formation." The governor of Connecticut at the time we conducted the studies (2005–2006) belonged to the Republican party, the governor of Baden-Württemberg to the Christian-Democratic-Union (conservative party).

After providing informed consent, participants read the instructions and provided their essay responses. They were then debriefed, thanked for their participation, and compensated with a choice of gift certificates to local coffee shops or candy and soda.

### 2.1.4. Content analysis

Content-analytic procedures were modeled after previous cross-cultural research utilizing content-analytic methodology (Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001; Purdie-Vaughns, Steele, Davies, Dittmann, & Crosby, 2008; Tropp & Bianchi, 2006) and involved a two-step process: identifying coding categories that emerged from the data and then categorizing the data. Two independent judges identified categories and coded all essays. To ensure that coders remained unaware of the study's hypothesis and the participants' country of origin, coders were presented with a cover story and the nationality of individual participants was obscured. Specifically, coders were told that all responses had been back-translated and all responses included a mixture of original and translated texts. In addition, where possible, references to participants' national origin were eliminated from the essays (Kanagawa et al., 2001).

**2.1.4.1. Coding categories.** To identify coding categories, an empirical inductive approach was used (Smith, 2000). Coders were instructed to read essays without a particular theoretical focus, specific category types, or ideal number of categories in mind. Categories were developed based on common themes that consistently emerged (Smith, 2000). This process yielded 10 categories (see Table 1).

**Table 1**

Categories used to code responses to the question "What does it mean to be American/German?"

Categories	Examples	Agreement (Kappa)	United States (n = 45)	Germany (n = 62)	p-Value
Ideology-based categories:					
(1) Freedom and democracy	Freedom of speech. To live in a democracy.	1.00*	91%	31%	<.01
(2) Including groups from other cultures	The mix of cultures. Several cultures.	.92*	24%	7%	.02
(3) Patriotism	The troops give us a lot to be proud.	.78*	13%	5%	.23
(4) Protestant work ethic	It is nice to be German. With hard work, you can live a good life.	.85*	7%	0%	.14
Heritage-based categories:					
(5) Ancestors and cultural traditions	My family and neighbors. German culture.	1.00*	18%	61%	<.01
(6) Having certain personality traits	Ambitious. Punctual.	.95*	11%	37%	<.01
(7) Negative political history	Embarrassing past because of Hitler.	.91*	0%	18%	<.01
Neutral categories:					
(8) Denying one's identity	Being German means nothing to me.	.79*	0%	13%	.03
(9) High standard of living and safety	The best healthcare. To live in safety.	.94*	38%	44%	.55
(10) Other	Making love to my wife.	.79*	44%	37%	.44

Note. The first example for each category was generated by an American participant and the second example by a German participant.

\*  $p < .01$ , two-tailed.

Four categories that emerged from the data emphasized transcendent and abstract values (“freedom and democracy,” “including groups from other cultures,” “Protestant work ethic,” and “patriotism”). These categories are consistent with ideology-based constructs and thus we expected a higher percentage of Americans to write statements that would fall into these categories. Three categories emphasized self-descriptive traits and cultural traditions (“ancestors and cultural traditions,” “having certain personality traits,” and “negative political history”). These categories are consistent with heritage-based constructs and thus we expected a higher percentage of Germans to write statements that would fall into these categories. Finally, three categories were not specific to either an ideology- or heritage-based identity (“denying one’s identity,” “high standard of living,” and “other”). Across the 10 categories, inter-rater reliability was high, Cohen’s Kappa = .89 ( $SD = .09$ , range = .78–1).

At the conclusion of identifying categories by the authors of the paper, two different bilingual coders used these categories to content-analyze all essays. In discussion with the authors, the coders demarcated all essays into response units. Each response unit consisted of an independent clause with one meaning-statement. The number of response units in a given essay ranged from 1 to 24 statements about the meaning of national identity. For each essay, coders then independently examined all response units and determined whether the essay as a whole included each of the categories in at least one of the response units. Thus, coders coded the presence or absence of a given category and the unit of analysis was the number of people whose essay included a given category.

## 2.2. Results and discussion

The analysis of response units confirmed that essay length did not vary as a function of participant’s country of origin ( $M = 4.60$ ,  $SD = 2.67$ ),  $t(105) = -.38$ , *ns*.

If Americans conceptualize their national identity as more ideology-based than Germans and Germans conceptualize their national identity as more heritage-based than Americans, then we would expect significant differences in the frequency of categories that include ideology- and heritage-based concepts. Accordingly, we averaged responses across our four ideology-based categories (freedom and democracy, Protestant work ethic, including groups from other cultures, and patriotism) and our three heritage-based categories (ancestors and cultural traditions, having certain personality traits, and political history) and conducted a  $\chi^2$  analysis with culture of participant (American and German) and presence of category (participant wrote about concept, participant did not write about concept) as factors. Yates’ correction for continuity was used when at least one cell had fewer than five observations (Siegel & Castellan, 1988). As predicted, a higher percentage of American participants mentioned ideology-based categories,  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 41.61$ ,  $p < .01$  relative to German participants, and a higher percentage of German participants mentioned heritage-based categories,  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 48.61$ ,  $p < .01$ , relative to American participants.

$\chi^2$  tests conducted on each of our seven categories separately yielded the same pattern of results. Analyses of each ideology-based category revealed that a higher percentage of American participants mentioned “freedom and democracy,”  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 36.28$ ,  $p < .01$ , and “including groups from other cultures,”  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 5.59$ ,  $p = .02$ , relative to German participants. Interestingly, nearly all American participants mentioned “freedom and democracy” in comparison to only one-third of German participants, and American participants were three times more likely than German participants to mention “including groups from other cultures.” Analysis of the category, “Protestant work ethic” must be interpreted with caution because of the small number of observations. Consistent with our predictions, however, 7% of American participants mentioned the Protestant work ethic,  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 2.16$ ,  $p = .14$ , in comparison to 0% of German participants.

Analyses of each heritage-based category revealed that a higher percentage of German participants mentioned “ancestors and cultural traditions,”  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 20.14$ ,  $p < .01$ , and “having certain personality characteristics,”  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 9.11$ ,  $p < .01$ , relative to American participants. Indeed, more than half of German participants generated at least one response that was categorized as “ancestors and cultural traditions” in comparison to 18% of American participants. German participants mentioned “having certain personality traits” almost four times more often than American participants. Finally, 18% of German participants but none of American participants, mentioned “negative political history”,  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 7.10$ ,  $p < .01$ , past events that negatively impacted on the country as a whole.

American and German participants seemed to differ on categories that we posit are relevant to national identity, except for “patriotism,”  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 1.46$ ,  $p = .23$ . However, “denying one’s identity” which is related to patriotism insofar as it signals the absence of patriotism was more frequent among German than American participants,  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = 4.55$ ,  $p = .03$ . No significant differences emerged in the number of American and German participants who mentioned “high standard of living,”  $\chi^2(1, n = 107) = .36$ , *ns*, and this was the most popular category among participants from both countries (41%).

To summarize, essays written by American and German citizens reflected what we argue are ideology- and heritage-based identities, respectively. Ideology-based concepts such as freedom, including groups from other cultures and the Protestant work ethic were significantly more often articulated in essays written by Americans. In contrast, heritage-based concepts such as ancestors and cultural traditions, personality traits, and negative political history were significantly more often articulated in essays written by German citizens. Overall, the results of Study 1 show that ideology- and heritage-based dimensions of national identity are dimensions on which cultures may be compared in meaningful ways and provides a qualitative confirmation of findings in the social identity work by Pehrson et al. (2009).

### 3. Study 2

An important function of national identity is to guide how citizens perceive and treat newcomers to their homeland. We posit that the type of national identity citizens endorse has implications for citizens' attitudes towards immigrants. In particular, citizens may experience a sense of threat if an immigrant pursues an acculturation strategy that is discordant with their own definitions of citizenship (Rohmann, Piontkowski, & Van Randenborgh, 2008). Examining citizens' attitudes towards an immigrant who either fulfills or rejects these expectations provides important evidence about the type of national identity at play in a given culture and the implications of national identity type for citizen-immigrant relations. The second objective of this paper is to test this proposition.

As we proposed in the introduction, ideology-based identities are organized around a core set of transcendent and abstract national values. Given that social validation is one of the few epistemic foundations of values (Festinger, 1957), immigrants who reject the core values of their host nation may be subject to exclusion from national identity. An immigrant who lives in his or her society of settlement out of mere convenience, for instance, should be excluded by citizens who have an ideology-based national identity. Conversely, heritage-based national identities are organized around reinforcing the distinctive qualities of national identity. Conceiving of a common identity that is shared by both, immigrants and citizens, is in contradiction to the defining elements of a heritage-based national identity and can lead to negative attitudes towards immigrants in that context (Esses, Wagner, Wolf, Preiser, & Wilbur, 2006). Accordingly, immigrants who express attachment towards their society of settlement's national identity without sharing its cultural heritage destabilize the cultural bond that holds the nation together and thus may be excluded by citizens who have a heritage-based national identity. Perhaps paradoxically, immigrants who admit that they reside in their society of settlement merely out of convenience may be relatively more accepted by citizens with a heritage-based identity compared to those with an ideology-based identity. These mere residents are less likely to threaten the distinctiveness and relative impermeability of the heritage-based national identity. Accordingly, whether citizens of a country have an ideology- or a heritage-based national identity should guide the conditions under which they exclude an immigrant.

This reasoning led us to design an experiment with American and German citizens reading an ostensible interview of an immigrant who recently acquired citizenship in their respective countries. Across all conditions, the immigrant was depicted as possessing a strong ethnic identity by a statement he makes in the first part of the transcript. We carefully crafted this statement so as to not directly evoke cultural stereotypes associated with a particular group of immigrants in either country. The immigrant describes customs and traditions of a foreign culture and emphasizes how important they are to him but never mentions specific traditions that the reader might be familiar with.

Our experimental manipulation was part of the immigrant's explanation for seeking citizenship. In the affective rationale condition, the immigrant endorsed his new country's national identity (e.g., "I am proud to be an American [German] citizen") and emphasized the affective benefits of citizenship (e.g., "I am glad to be American [German]"). We reasoned that by doing so, the immigrant would demonstrate that national identity is embodied in ideals and abstract values that he can and should express. As this is consistent with American citizens' ideology-based conceptualization of their national identity and inconsistent with Germans' heritage-based conceptualization of their national identity, German citizens should exclude an immigrant with the affective rationale for citizenship while American citizens should not.

In the pragmatic rationale condition, the immigrant did not endorse his host country's national identity and emphasized the pragmatic benefits of citizenship (e.g. "fewer problems with the administration"). By focusing exclusively on the pragmatic benefits of citizenship, we reasoned that the immigrant would demonstrate his understanding of the distinctiveness of national identity and respect the identity by not claiming it. As this is consistent with Germans' heritage-based conceptualization of their national identity and inconsistent with Americans' ideology-based conceptualization of their national identity, American citizens should exclude an immigrant with a pragmatic rationale while German citizens should not. In the control condition, the immigrant provided no rationale for becoming a citizen. Accordingly, this experiment was a 2 (culture: American, German)  $\times$  3 (target's citizenship rationale: affective, pragmatic, control) between-subjects design.

We measured participants' exclusion of immigrants by assessing how defining to their national identity several concepts that are difficult for an immigrant to acquire were (e.g., "having been born in the United States [Germany]"). To test the alternative explanation that our posited effects could be accounted for by baseline differences in patriotism alone rather than the broader concept of national identity type, we assessed citizens' ratings of the importance of their own national identity.

We hypothesized that American participants would be more likely than German participants to exclude immigrants when the target immigrant provided a pragmatic rationale for citizenship. In contrast, we hypothesized that German participants would be more likely than American participants to exclude immigrants when the target immigrant provided an affective rationale for citizenship.

#### 3.1. Method

##### 3.1.1. Participants

Sixty American and 62 German citizens participated. We excluded nine American and six German citizens from the analysis because they were not born in their country of citizenship, leaving 51 American citizens (26 women, 24 men, and 1 no gender recorded) and 56 German citizens (23 women, 32 men, and 1 no gender recorded) in the final analysis. The mean

age of American participants was 33.06 years ( $SD = 13.85$ , 1 no age recorded) and mean age of German participants was 31.12 years ( $SD = 11.55$ , 4 no age recorded),  $t(100) = -.77$ , *ns*. The majority of American participants identified as “middle-class” (35%) or “upper middle class” (37%) and had a secondary degree (Associate or Bachelor’s degree: 22%; graduate school: 32%) or were working towards a secondary degree (some college) as their highest level of education (43%). For political orientation, 71% consider themselves liberals and 12% conservatives, the rest had no political affiliation (8%; 9% no political orientation recorded).

The majority of German participants identified as “middle-class” (68%) or “upper middle class” (18%) and had a secondary degree (Fachhochschulabschluss: 5%; Universitaetsabschluss: 32%) or were working towards a secondary degree as their highest level of education (Abitur or Fachabitur, 46%). For political orientation, 66% considered themselves liberals and 5% conservatives, the rest had either no political affiliation (20%) or indicated that they did not know their political affiliation (5%; 4% no political orientation recorded).

American and German participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions.

### 3.1.2. Stimulus materials

Participants read an ostensible transcript of an interview of an immigrant who recently became an American [German] citizen. The transcript included responses to three questions about the immigrant’s ethnic identity and citizenship, and was accompanied by a photograph of him. As in Study 1, back translation was used for all materials and measures (Brislin, 1970).

**3.1.2.1. Representation of the immigrant.** To bolster our cover story, photographs of the ostensible immigrant were included as part of the video transcript.

**3.1.2.2. Manipulation.** In the bulk of the transcript, the immigrant described the importance of his ethnic traditions. This remained constant across conditions.

For our manipulation, the immigrant provided either an affective or a pragmatic justification for obtaining American [German] citizenship.

The affective condition read as follows:

I feel like I belong in America [Germany]. I do have a strong cultural heritage that is very different from the American [German] culture. The way I am I belong in the U.S. [Germany]. Let me say also that I am proud to be an American [German] citizen. I love being an American [German]. The way I am I feel American [German] and I am glad that, under the law, now I am.

The pragmatic condition read as follows:

I don’t really feel like I belong to this country. I have spent a lot of time getting to know the American [German] culture and I tolerate and respect it very much but I cannot identify with it. I have a strong cultural heritage and with this heritage I am not really American [German]. Of course, I know English [German] and I follow American [German] laws. I decided to become an American [German] citizen because American [German] citizenship makes it easier for me to travel worldwide. Also I have fewer problems with the administration. The way I am I do not really feel American [German] but life is just easier being a citizen.

In the control condition, the immigrant discussed leisure activities and the weather.

### 3.1.3. Procedure

Two experimenters per country recruited participants at public parks and fairs in Connecticut, USA and Baden-Württemberg, Germany. The recruiting locations and strategies were either identical or very similar to Study 1 to obtain a similar sample and ensure consistency in conceptualizations of national identity across both studies. Experimenters were unaware of study hypotheses and conditions.

Participants were run individually. Upon obtaining informed consent, experimenters presented the cover story and study materials. To reduce social desirability, we developed a cover story about impression formation and rapid decision-making processes. Participants were told they would participate in a study examining “whether impression formation was influenced by length of media presentations.” To bolster the cover story, our experimental booth displayed popular press books about intuitive decision-making techniques. All participants were told they were in the “short passage and not the long passage” condition. They were then asked to read a short passage from an ostensible range of topics. All participants “selected” the transcript about immigration where the experimental manipulation was embedded.

After reading the transcript, participants completed all measures including filler items about decision-making; they were then fully debriefed, thanked for their time and compensated with snacks and drinks.

### 3.1.4. Dependent measures

**3.1.4.1. Exclusion from national identity.** Our primary dependent measure assessed how much individuals believed that immigrants could be integrated into a given country. This measure was adapted from previous research on national identity (Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001; Devos & Banaji, 2005). Participants rated how important four statements were to their sense of American identity on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all important*; 7 = *very important*). Items were “having lived

most of one's life in the United States [Germany], "being an American [German] citizen," "having American [German] grandparents" and "having American [German] parents." Items were averaged to form a single score of exclusion from national identity ( $\alpha = .77$ ), with higher scores indicating higher levels of exclusion. Overall means were 3.67 ( $SD = 1.36$ ) for American participants and 3.36 ( $SD = 1.38$ ) for German participants,  $t(104) = -1.14$ ,  $p = .25$ .

**3.1.4.2. Importance of national identity.** Two items assessed importance of national identity: "How important is your national identity to you?" and "My national identity is an important part of who I am" ( $\alpha = .91$ ; 1 = *not at all important/strongly disagree*, 7 = *extremely important/strongly agree*). Mean values were 4.93 ( $SD = 1.60$ ) for American participants and 3.96 ( $SD = 1.55$ , 1 missing) for German participants,  $t(103) = -3.13$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $d = .62$ .

**3.1.4.3. Manipulation checks.** Manipulation checks measured whether participants perceived the immigrant to feel positively in relation to his citizenship and participants' perceptions of the strength of his ethnic identity. Three perceived positive affect items (e.g., "The person in the video transcript wanted to become a citizen because he feels American [German]") were combined to form a single measure ( $\alpha = .81$ ; 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Mean values were 4.15 ( $SD = 1.43$ , 1 missing) for American participants and 3.77 ( $SD = 1.32$ ) for German participants,  $t(103) = -1.38$ ,  $p = .17$ . For perceived ethnic identity, two items (e.g., "culture is very important to the person in the video-transcript") were combined to form a single measure ( $\alpha = .86$ ; 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Mean values were 5.33 ( $SD = 1.58$ , 1 missing) for American participants and 5.17 ( $SD = 1.68$ ) for German participants,  $t(103) = -.49$ ,  $p = .62$ .<sup>4</sup>

## 3.2. Results and discussion

### 3.2.1. Manipulation checks

Positive affect towards citizenship was analyzed using a 2 (culture: American, German)  $\times$  3 (citizenship rationale: pragmatic, affective, control) between-subjects ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect of immigrant's citizenship rationale,  $F(2,99) = 30.17$ ,  $p < .01$ . As expected, participants in the affective condition perceived the immigrant as expressing more positive affect towards citizenship ( $M = 5.10$ ,  $SD = 1.06$ ) than in the pragmatic condition ( $M = 3.08$ ,  $SD = 1.05$ ),  $F(1,100) = 58.53$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $d = 1.91$  or the control condition ( $M = 3.71$ ,  $SD = 1.18$ ),  $F(1,100) = 26.10$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $d = 1.24$ . No other main or interaction effects reached significance, all  $F_s < 1.5$ .<sup>5</sup>

Perceived ethnic identity of the target immigrant was analyzed using a 2 (culture: American, German)  $\times$  3 (citizenship rationale: affective, pragmatic, control) between-subjects ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect of immigrant's citizenship rationale,  $F(2,99) = 45.67$ ,  $p < .01$ . As expected, participants in the affective condition ( $M = 5.98$ ,  $SD = .97$ ) were not less likely than participants in the pragmatic condition ( $M = 6.07$ ,  $SD = 1.22$ ) to perceive the immigrant's ethnic identity as high,  $F(1,100) = .09$ ,  $p = .77$ . Moreover, participants in the affective condition perceived the immigrant's ethnic identity as higher relative to participants in the control condition ( $M = 3.54$ ,  $SD = 1.33$ ),  $F(1,100) = 67.2$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $d = 2.04$  and participants in the pragmatic condition did as well,  $F(1,100) = 72.82$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $d = 1.98$ . No other main or interaction effects reached significance, all  $F_s < 1$ .

### 3.2.2. Exclusion from national identity

Exclusion from national identity was analyzed using a 2 (culture: American, German)  $\times$  3 (citizenship rationale: pragmatic, affective, control) between-subjects ANOVA. The analysis yielded only a significant interaction,  $F(2, 100) = 6.42$ ,  $p < .01$  (see Fig. 1). In the affective condition—the condition where the immigrant expressed a sense of belonging and positive affect towards his new country—German participants expressed more exclusionary definitions of national identity than American participants,  $F(1,100) = 5.06$ ,  $p = .03$ ,  $d = .80$ . In the pragmatic condition—the condition where the immigrant denied an emotional bond but respected the distinctiveness of the culture—American participants expressed more exclusionary definitions of national identity than German participants,  $F(1,100) = 4.93$ ,  $p = .03$ ,  $d = .70$ . In the control condition, American participants were significantly more exclusionary relative to German participants,  $F(1,100) = 4.34$ ,  $p = .04$ ,  $d = .69$ , a finding consistent with the notion that American citizens require strong personal attachment from immigrants in order to psychologically include them as part of their citizenry.

### 3.2.3. Alternative explanation

It is possible that our exclusion from national identity findings could be explained by differences in American and German levels of patriotism rather than different national identity types. Importantly, the 2  $\times$  3 ANCOVA with importance of national identity as a covariate did not significantly affect exclusion from national identity results,  $F(2,98) = 5.52$ ,  $p < .01$ .

<sup>4</sup> For exploratory purposes we included two additional measures: attitudes towards the immigrant (Fein & Spencer, 1997) and a measure of national acceptance that we created. The predicted culture by citizenship rationale was not significant for either measure.

<sup>5</sup> Participants responses to all measures did not vary as a function of which photograph was included as part of the transcript. Including photograph as a covariate for all measures reported above did not change any of the results.




Fig. 1. Exclusion from national identity among American and German participants in Study 2.

### 3.2.4. Discussion

According to our hypotheses, violation of ideology-based norms—the norms we argue American citizens hold—involves an immigrant questioning the broad values and positive affect that constitute this identity. Violation of heritage-based norms—the norms we argue Germans hold—threatens the qualifications and traits that uniquely define that identity. The results from our exclusion from national identity measure provide initial support for this hypothesis. When learning about an immigrant who recently became a citizen for pragmatic reasons, Americans expressed more exclusionary definitions of national identity than Germans, but when learning about an immigrant who became a citizen for affective reasons, Germans expressed more exclusionary definitions of national identity than Americans. Moreover, baseline differences in patriotism did not account for these results. The exclusion of national identity measure was designed to tap into making national identity more restrictive. One limitation of this measure is that some of the items seem more relevant to heritage-based than ideology-based reasons for exclusion (e.g. “having American [German] parents”). Future research should include items that tap into ideology-based reasons for exclusion such as succeeding on a citizenship test or reciting the pledging the allegiance in the United States. However, despite the fact that the exclusion measure may have been biased towards heritage-based reasons for exclusion it still showed the predicted effects in both samples.

## 4. General discussion

In two experiments we demonstrated that lay definitions of national identity differ between the United States and Germany and that conceptions of national identity can have an impact on the conditions under which citizens express more or less exclusion from national identity. In Study 1, citizens of the United States, a country that ascribes citizenship to all persons born in its territory, expressed a core set of transcendent and abstract values when asked about the meaning of their national identity. In contrast, citizens of Germany, a country that ascribes citizenship to descendants of citizens regardless of where they reside, expressed specific self-descriptive traits and referred to their cultural traditions when asked about the meaning of their national identity.

In Study 2, violations of national identity expectations led to higher levels of exclusion from national identity on the part of citizens. Reading about an immigrant who pursued an instrumental strategy led American but not German participants to express higher levels of exclusion from national identity. By contrast, reading about an immigrant who pursued an affective strategy led German but not American participants to express higher levels of exclusion from national identity. Taken together, these results support the idea that national identity is shaped by the historical, legal, and cultural context in which citizenship evolves. Furthermore, national identity informs not only how citizens perceive themselves, but also how they perceive and respond to immigrants who reside within the borders of their nation.

In identifying individual-level variables as manifestations of cultural differences we follow a growing body of literature emphasizing that formative historical conditions can become imprinted in institutions that then shape and are shaped by present-day cultural differences in psychological variables (Cohen, 2001). Differences in institutional definitions of citizenship affect the meaning and content of national identity among citizens, which then have consequences for the relations between citizens and immigrants. Of course, we are not suggesting that writing essays about national identity or responding to representations of immigrants can fully encompass all manifestations and cultural representations of national identity. However, our aim was to provide evidence for the association between socio-cultural models of naturalization and lay definitions of citizenship, and their consequences for citizen-immigrant relations. We believe the results of our two studies achieve this aim.

Previous research on multiculturalism has documented numerous benefits of a bicultural identity in which the individual identifies strongly both with the superordinate national identity group and a particular ethnic subgroup (Huo, Smith, Tyler, and Lind, 1996; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993). However, the results of Study 2 suggest that this bicultural identity pattern may be more successful in some cultural settings than in others, depending on the dominant national identity

type. We found that an immigrant who expressed strong identification with both his superordinate national identity and his particular ethnic identity led to more inclusive attitudes towards immigrants among American participants but more exclusionary attitudes among German participants. These findings underscore the need to be sensitive to the broader cultural context when promoting bicultural identification as a solution to problems of social cohesion in pluralistic societies (Purdie-Vaughns & Dittmann, 2010). While bicultural identities among immigrant and ethnic minority groups may produce positive outcomes in cultures with an ideology-based model of national identity, bicultural identities have the potential to provoke anti-immigrant backlash in cultures with a heritage-based model of national identity. Future research examining a broader array of attitudes and behaviors is needed to assess the balance of positive and negative outcomes associated with bicultural identity expression in both ideology-based and heritage-based cultures.

Another important and novel aspect of the present research is that citizens accept immigrants only when they endorse national identity-specific norms. It is well known that immigrants are targets of exclusion and discrimination in North America (Deaux, 2006a, 2006b) and in Europe (Bratt, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998; Quillian, 1995; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; Wagner & Machleit, 1986). Such research on immigration tends to emphasize discrimination based on attributes (race, identity) and social class more than discrimination based on an immigrant's values. Our findings contribute to this literature by *specifying the conditions under which* exclusion based on ethnic attributes and values is more and less likely to occur. Investigating exclusion of immigrants based on ethnic attributes *and* values may further our understanding of discrimination against immigrants more than focusing exclusively on ethnic attributes.

#### 4.1. Limitations and issues for future research

We note four limitations in the present research. First, our experimental manipulation did not specify the ostensible immigrant's economic status. It would be inaccurate to suggest that identity-based concerns triggered by citizens' national identity type would completely outweigh economic concerns in relation to their attitudes towards immigrants. Indeed, Sniderman et al.'s (2004) research suggests that realistic threat elicited by economic concerns trumps any identity-based exclusion. Our findings nevertheless show that identity-based concerns can play a major role in determining how citizens respond to immigrants.

A second limitation concerns the methodology of Study 2. Because this study was conducted outside the laboratory, pencil and paper measures were used. While every effort was made to decrease social desirability, explicit measures are susceptible to participants' desires to respond in a normative manner (Dovidio, Kawakami, Smoak, & Gaertner, 2008). Facial coding of surprise, confusion and upset are commonly used in psychology as evidence of norm violations and social threats (Bassili, 1979), and we would expect American and German citizens to show symptoms (e.g., facial displays) of distress and surprise as a result of observing a fellow citizen violate respective national identity norms. Future research may benefit from the use of such non-obtrusive measures.

A third limitation concerns our convenience sample. We selected similar locations in the United States and Germany and deployed the same recruiting strategy to sample a demographically group of people in both countries. While this goes beyond biases in psychological research that samples largely college students (Sears, 1986), our samples are certainly not representative for the two countries. Especially in the German sample, where expression of national identity seem to be less consensual than in the American sample, we may find that national identity is differently constructed in different political and social spheres. Future research should replicate our qualitative analyses using different samples.

Finally, our long-term objective is to investigate the present hypotheses in countries beyond the United States and Germany. Canada, for instance, with its favorable attitudes toward immigration (Oudenhoven, Ward, & Masgoret, 2006), may exemplify an ideology-based national identity type, while Austria, with its restrictive citizenship policy and lack of historical colonies (Pettigrew, 1998), may exemplify a heritage-based national identity type. In general, we assume that relatively more individuals in European countries will hold a heritage-based view of their national identity than will individuals in countries of immigration, such as the United States or Australia. Within a given culture, however, individuals will vary in the extent to which they are good cultural representatives and construe their national identity in the mandated way. Also, most national identities are probably not exclusively ideology- or heritage-based but elements of both types of national identity are dimensions on which all cultures may be situated and compared in meaningful ways.

#### 4.2. Conclusion

In conclusion, our findings suggest that it is important to consider not only what types of citizens are likely to exclude certain types of immigrants, but also what the conditions are under which such exclusion is likely to occur. It provides a psychological variable, national identity that can bridge the gap between history and its manifestation in present-day institutions, and aid in our understanding of the psychology motivating immigrant citizen relations.

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